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中级微观经济学精要:英文版 本书特色
《中级微观经济学精要(英文版)》在中级层次上，以微积分为工具，简要介绍了微观经济学的核心概念。作者首先介绍了消费者理论，讨论了偏好和效用、预算约束、消费者的优先选择、需要及消费者的劳动力供给与储蓄决策等，之后介绍了福利经济学，再之后又介绍了企业决策理论，讨论了竞争市场、垄断市场和双寡头市场等的局部均衡，还分析了由外部性、公共品和不对称信息导致的市场失灵，以及不确定性条件下的决策与博弈论等等内容，本书辅以图形分析，有助于学生掌握相关知识。
中级微观经济学精要:英文版 内容简介
本书在中级层次上, 以微积分为工具, 简要介绍了微观经济学的核心概念。作者首先介绍了消费者理论, 讨论了偏好和效用、预算约束、消费者的*优选择、需要及消费者的劳动力供给与储蓄决策等, 之后介绍了福利经济学, 再之后又介绍了企业决策理论, 讨论了竞争市场、垄断市场和双
中级微观经济学精要:英文版 目录
preface1 introductionpart ⅰ theory of the consumer2 preferences and utility 2.1 introduction 2.2 the consumer's preference relation 2.3 the marginal rate of substitution 2.4 the consumer's utility function 2.5 utility functions and the marginal rate of substitution 2.6 a solved problem exercises appendix. differentiation of functions3 the budget constraint and the consumer's optimal choice 3.1 introduction 3.2 the standard budget constraint, the budget set, and the budget line 3.3 shifts of the budget line 3.4 odd budget constraints 3.5 income and consumption over time 3.6 the consumer's optimal choice: graphical analysis 3.7 the consumer's optimal choice: utility maximization subject to the budget constraint 3.8 two solved problems exercises appendix. maximization subject to a constraint: the lagrange function method4 demand functions 4.1 introduction 4.2 demand as a function of income 4.3 demand as a function of price 4.4 demand as a function of price of the other good 4.5 substitution and income effects 4.6 the compensated demand curve 4.7 elasticity 4.8 the market demand curve 4.9 a solved problem exercises5 supply functions for labor and savings 5.1 introduction to the supply of labor 5.2 choice between consumption and leisure 5.3 substitution and income effects in labor supply 5.4 other types of budget constraints 5.5 taxing the consumer's wages 5.6 saving and borrowing: the intertemporal choice of consumption 5.7 the supply of savings 5.8 a solved problem exercises6 welfare economics 1: the one-person case 6.1 introduction 6.2 welfare comparison of a per-unit tax and an equivalent lump-sum tax 6.3 rebating a per-unit tax 6.4 measuring a change in welfare for one person 6.5 measuring welfare for many people; a preliminary example 6.6 a solved problem exercises appendix. revealed preference7 welfare economics 2: the many-person case 7.1 introduction 7.2 quasilinear preferences 7.3 consumer's surplus 7.4 a consumer's surplus example with quasilinear preferences 7.5 consumers' surplus 7.6 a last word on the quasilinearity assumption 7.7 a solved problem exercisespart ⅱ theory of the producer8 theory of the firm 1: the single-input model 8.1 introduction 8.2 the competitive firm's problem, focusing on its output 8.3 the competitive firm's problem, focusing on its input 8.4 multiple outputs 8.5 a solved problem exercises9 theory of the firm 2: the long-run, multiple-input model 9.1 introduction 9.2 the production function in the long run 9.3 cost minimization in the long run 9.4 profit maximization in the long run 9.5 a solved problem exercises10 theory of the firm 3: the short-run, multiple-input model 10.1 introduction 10.2 the production function in the short run 10.3 cost minimization in the short run 10.4 profit maximization in the short run 10.5 a solved problem exercisespart ⅲ partial equilibrium analysis: market structure11 perfectly competitive markets 11.1 introduction 11.2 perfect competition 11.3 market/industry supply 11.4 equilibrium in a competitive market 11.5 competitive equilibrium and social surplus maximization 11.6 the deadweight loss of a per-unit tax 11.7 a solved problem exercises12 monopoly and monopolistic competition 12.1 introduction 12.2 the classical solution to monopoly 12.3 deadweight loss from monopoly: comparing monopoly and competition 12.4 price discrimination 12.5 monopolistic competition 12.6 a solved problem exercises13 duopoly 13.1 introduction 13.2 cournot competition 13.3 more on dynamics 13.4 collusion 13.5 stackelberg competition 13.6 bertrand competition 13.7 a solved problem exercises14 game theory 14.1 introduction 14.2 the prisoners' dilemma, and the idea of dominant strategy equilibrium 14.3 prisoners' dilemma complications: experimental evidence and repeated games 14.4 the battle of the sexes, and the idea of nash equilibrium 14.5 battle of the sexes complications: multiple or no nash equilibria, and mixed strategies 14.6 the expanded battle of the sexes, when more choices make players worse off 14.7 sequential move games 14.8 threats 14.9 a solved problem exercisespart iv general equilibrium analysis15 an exchange economy 15.1 introduction 15.2 an economy with two consumers and two goods 15.3 pareto efficiency 15.4 competitive or walrasian equilibrium 15.5 the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics 15.6 a solved problem exercises16 a production economy 16.1 introduction 16.2 a robinson crusoe production economy 16.3 pareto efficiency 16.4 walrasian or competitive equilibrium 16.5 when there are two goods, bread and rum 16.6 the two welfare theorems revisited 16.7 a solved problem exercisespart v market failure17 externalities 17.1 introduction 17.2 examples of externalities 17.3 the oil refiner and the fish farm 17.4 classical solutions to the externality problem: pigou and coase 17.5 modern solutions for the externality problem: markets for pollution rights 17.6 modern solutions for the externality problem: cap and trade 17.7 a solved problem exercises18 public goods 18.1 introduction 18.2 examples of public goods 18.3 a simple model of an economy with a public good 18.4 the samuelson optimality condition 18.5 the free rider problem and voluntary contribution mechanisms 18.6 how to get efficiency in economies with public goods 18.7 a solved problem exercises19 uncertainty and expected utility 19.1 introduction and examples 19.2 von neumann-morgenstern expected utility: preliminaries 19.3 von neumann-morgenstern expected utility: assumptions and conclusion 19.4 von neumann-morgenstern expected utility: examples 19.5 a solved problem exercises20 uncertainty and asymmetric information 20.1 introduction 20.2 when sellers know more than buyers: the market for "lemons" 20.3 when buyers know more than sellers: a market for health insurance 20.4 when insurance encourages risk taking: moral hazard 20.5 the principal-agent problem 20.6 what should be done about market failures caused by asymmetric information 20.7 a solved problem exercisesindex
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